lIE strong rise in the value of the dollar-in the early 1980s and its sharp decline since February 1985 are alleged to have had wide-ranging effects on the economies of the United States and its major trading partners. In response to concerns about the costs of adjusting to lam-ge exchange rate movements specifically and the effects of divergent economic policies generally, policymakers have called for greater coom'dination of economic policies among the world's major industrial countries.' But, despite the stated official desire for greaten-policy coordination, little is certain about how it might work in pr-ac-tic-c-. Some theoretical results suggest that there are potential gains fnom coordinated policy actions; these results, however-, are not robust.'
One example of an explicit agreement for policy coordination is the Eunopean Monetary System IEMS). Established in 1979, the EMS was formed to stabilize bilateral nominal exchange rates among member countries. Because it is difficult to identi~'the direct benefits of more stable exchange rates per se, analysts typically have discussed the potential benefits of such coom-dination in terms of increased trade flows, faster real growth amid policy convergence among member' nations.
'At the September 1985 Plaza Accord, for example, the G-5 countries agreed to coordinated intervention policies that would reduce the value of the dollar. Since that meeting, there have been subsequent economic "summits" to discuss both target values for exchange rates (the Louvre Accord of February 1987) and indicators by which policies could be monitored (the June 1987 Venice Summit). Both the Bank for International Settlements (815) and the OECD have called for greater fiscal policy cooperation, with lower budget deficits in the United States and expansionary policies in Japan and Germany. See Bank for International Settlements (1987) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1987) .
'Models using game theory have tended to conclude that policy cooperation will produce lower social welfare losses than noncooperative policies. Some empirical work has provided evidence that supports the game theory results; see Currie and Levine, for example. It should be noted, however, that both lines of work are based on arbitrary social welfare functions and the existence of a benevolent policymaker. The public choice literature, in contrast, suggests that the wealth of the policymaker dominates social objectives as a criterion for choosing particular policy paths. If true, a quite different loss function would apply to policy choices. More generally, the game-theoretic results depend heavily on the loss function specified. Fischer (1987) and Frankel and Rockett (1987) also have shown that the results depend importantly upon the economic models used to evaluate policy effects.
As the one case in which some fom-m of explicit coopem'ation has been adopted. the EMS offer-s an opportunity land data) to examine its effect on a variety of economic-indicators. This article n-c-views the economic experience of EMS countr'ies relative to non-EMS countries during the 1980s to see whether exchange rate coordination has been associated with differential gains in other' measures of economic well-being as well as to draw inferences about the likely effects of policy coordination on a greater scale by the industrial economies.
THE EMS: AN OVERVIEW
The EMS, which was established formally on Marc-h 13, 1979, was fir-st composed of the nine European Community (EC) countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Nethemlands and the United Kingdom. Greece, which subsequently joined the EC, became an EMS partner in 1985 but Spain and Pontugal, which joined the EC in 1984, have not yet become members of the EMS. Briefly, EMS membership requires each nation first to deposit 20 percent of its gold and gross dollan assets with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). In exchange, each nation receives an equivalent amount of European Curmenc-y Units IECUs), which serve primarily as a unit of ac-count for-EMS functions (see Appendixi. This asset exchange, however, is not so much a separate part of joining the EMS as it is a preliminary step to pursuing the System's objectives.' The second part of EMS membership involves the agr-eement to pursue stable nominal exchange rates, at agreed levels, for each bilateral set of rates. One rationale for this policy objective is that exchange n-ate variability is a sour-ce of uncentaintv that meduc-es tm-ade and the traded goods sector is a large pon-tion of each EMS member economy. 4
Although exchange rate objectives are "set," the EMS is not str-ic-tly a fixed-i-ate system; adjustmemits to the exchange n-ate levels have been made horn time to time.' For example, in a major exchange i-ate i-c-alignment in Mar-c-h 1983, the Fn-ench fr-anc, Italian lu-a and lr'ish pound were devalued between 2.5 percent and 3.5 per-c-emit, while the remaining currencies were revalued between 2.5 percent (Danish krone) arid 5.5 per'-cent (Gem-man mark). As the tMF explains:
Like pm-evious realignments, this r-ealignment had become necessary as a m'csult of continued differences in the undem-lying stncngth of the t)~trtic-iPtiting countries' external positions, which reflected in turn divergences in economic policies and costIJrice pen-formance. These differences had gemnem--ated expectations of exchange i-ate changes and led to large speculative capital flows-' Similarly, in 1985, the lu-a was devalued 6 per-cent and other currencies n-evalued 2 percent when ltlhe wom-sening of the cur-remit account mefleclecl primarily the maintenance of a mate of growth in domestic demand higher than that ofttaly's partniems as welt as the lagged effects of a significant loss of competitiveness vis-a'-vis other EMS countm-ic-s over the previous two veam's,' Thus, when fundamental differences in economic perfom-mance n-equire changes in the established exchange n-ate tar-gets, the EMS has m-evalued them. Table 1 shows the dates of these revaluations and their effect on individual currencies.
Between revaluations, bilaten-al r-ates are allowed to vary within margimis of 2.25 percent of the desired values; because Italy historically has had higher mates of inflation than the other-EMS countr-ies, the lira has a band of 6 pen-cent. Should bilateral rates violate these margins, howeven', the central banks in contn-ol of the two currencies are expected to intervene in fon'eign exchange mnan-kets in amounts necessary to bring the rates back into the agn-eed-upon n-anges.'
The for-c-going discussion r'epresents a simple c-haracterization of EMS policy coom-dination. The most important exception to this cham'actemization for this study is that, although the U.K. exchanged 'A detailed summary of the ECU, as well as the evolution of the EMS, is in Ungerer, et al. (1986) . Karamouzis (1987) presents a shorter overview of the system and policy coordination. 'Both the theoretical and empirical evidence on a link between exchange rate variability and trade are ambiguous. DeGrauwe (1987 DeGrauwe ( , 1988 , for example, provides evidence suggestive of a negative effect. Many others, surveyed in Farrell, et al. (1983) , find no significant relationship between measures of exchange rate variability and trade. And, moving in the opposite direction, Franke (1987) provides theoretical reasoning for a positive relationship between exchange rate variability and trade. On balance, however, the predominant result seems to be that there is no important relationship between the two variables. 'Ungerer, et al., table 10. 'lbid, p.12. 'Ibid, p.13. 'See Ungerer. et al., . for a discussion of how interventions are conducted by the central banks of nations that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). gold and dollar meserves for-ECUs, it did not agree to participate in the cooperative effort to stabilize exchange rates.' Thus, while the U.K. is an EMS member-, its exchange rate is not specific-ally tied to those of the other EMS nations. To make this distinction, the EMS countr'ies that participate in the exchange mate mechanism (ERM) often are m-eferred to as the ERIVI countries.
The ERM Has Reduced Exchange Rate Variability
Various studies have concluded that the ERM has significantly reduced the variability of exchange rate movemetits among the member countmies. Table 2 , r-eproduced from an tMF study by Unger'er, et al. (1986) provides one indication of how much the var-iability of monthly average nominal exchange rates, as measured by the coefficient of variation, dec-lined after the EMS was formiied; a similar' pattern emerges if one examines data fur real exchange r'ates (nominal exchange rates adjusted by CPIs) or other measures of variability, such as standard deviations; these reductions in bilateral exchange rate variability between ERM pan'tic-ipants at'e statistically significant." Finally, as depicted in the bottom portion of table 2, the IMF analysis indicates that exchange rates for-non-ERM countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, generally experienced incr'eased var-iability in the post-1979 peiiod. Thus, m-elative to the exchange rate behavior of non-EPrM industrial countries, the ERM has significantly reduced fluctuations in the real and nominal bilateral exchange rates among its members.' ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION: A MORE GENERAL ANALYSIS 'I'he ERM has achieved greater exchange rate stability. The usefulness of such policy coot-dmation, however, must be judged ultimately on the basis of n'elative economic performance. This mone general c-miterion for judging the efficacy of such c-oordination is important because economic-theory does not suggest that stable exchange rates, per se, guam-antee genen-ally desirable economic outcomes.
'Greece, Portugal and Spain also do not participate in the exchange rate mechanism. "Ibid, pp. 4-Sand pp. 18-21. Also see related evidence, provided by Rogoff (1985a) , who found that bilateral exchange rates between EMS members have become more predictable.
"See Ungerer, etal., tables 16-21. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of a series divided by its mean. "A contrary view is presented by Fels (1987) . He argues that, because only n-i bilateral rates in an n-exchange rate system are freely determined, the ERM really is nothing more than a dollar/Dmami< system that pulls other exchange rates with it.
More important, he argues that the ERM appears to have succeeded in the early 1 980s only because the dollar's real value had risen sharply and stimulated export sales from ERM countries to the United States. As a consequence, member nations did not feel the need to pressure Germany to lead a currency devaluation through expansionary measures. Fels also conjectures -and is supported by recent developments -that realignments or other pressures on the ERM will occur as the dollar weakens.
Exchange Rate Stability, Economic Policies and Economic Performance
Are NOt Necessarily .Related!
The ERM does not spec-ifs' explicitly that member nations must coordinate policy actions. In other words, although the ERM member-s may agree to specific ranges on bilateral exchange rates, maintaining those ranges may be achieved, in principle, by a wide variety of policy actions.
To illustrate this point, consider a simple model of the nominal exchange rate; All variables in equation 1, except the interest rate, ame expressed as natural logarithms 13 The equation implies that a country's currency will depreciate (one unit of domestic c-unrency will purchase fewer-units of the foreign c-urrency) if domestic money growth accelerates, domestic-nominal inter-est rates decline or domestic real economicgrowth slows relative to changes in the equivalent measures in a foreign economy.
Once one recognizes, as in equation 1, that dUference.s between domestic-and foreign economic-values determine the level of exchange rates, one can see clearly that a stable value for the nominal exchange rate is consistent with many different economic and policy environments and outcomes. For example, two countries could cxhibit individually real growth of plus or minus 3 per-cent; as long as the differ-ence between their real growth tates remained unchanged, however', the exchange rate, c-dens pw-ibus, would be stable. Similar'ly, inflation in each country could be 20 pentent or zero; other things the same, however', the exchange rate would be stable so long as the inflation differential were stable. Thus, stable exchange rates c-an be observed under-a wide range of economic policies and conditions. Equation I also points out that the exchange rate c-an be affected by policy actions in either the domestic or foreign country. If, for example, e were the French franc-/DM exchange rate and the DM were rising Ic, measured as French francs per DM, would be rising), e could be decreased (the DM made to dec-line) by increasing the Gem-man money stock relative to the French money stock. One way in which this might he accomplished would involve the Bundesbank and/or the Bank of France selling DM-denominated assets and buying fmanc-denominated assets, thus increasing the supply of marks amid r-educing the supply of franc-s. These changes in the markets for the fm-ancand mark effectively would change the relative franc/DM price, that is, the exchange rate. ' 3 This model, taken from Dornbusch (1980) . is based on the standard monetary approach to the balance of payments.
Notice, however, the effects of such an action. The money supply would expand in Germany and decline in France. First, if the Bundesbank were pursuing money gn-owth within specified target ranges, the need for intervention of the sort desc-ribed could well lead to money growth above the announced target path. Mor-eover depending upon the magnitude and duration of intervention, the pursuit of a stable exchange rate land its effects on the German money stock) could cause a rising price level in Germany; other' short-run effects on output, unemployment and interest rates could be observed as well. Thus, in this one illustration. the two countries could achieve one objective at the expense of failing to attain others" ECONOMIC PERFORft'IANCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ERM Whether exchange rate stability has improved economic-performance or brought about gr'eater policy convergence among ERM countries is an empirical issue. In this section, this issue is assessed in two complementary ways.
ERM y5, iVon-ERM Economic Performance: Another Look at the Eiidence
To compare economic-conditions before and after the ERM agreement, a set of monthly data for major indicator-s of policy actions and economic performance in the ERM countries and selected large non-ERM economies was assembled. The test consists of comparing the average growth rates and variances of the narrow (Ml) money stock, CPI and index of industrial production and the average levels and variances of short-term interest rates between two periods : February 1975 -February 1979 (before ERMI, and April 1983 -December 1987 . The interval between Marc-h 1979-March 1983, which IMF analysis has characterized as 'frequent periods of exchange market strain and numerous consequent realignments of central rates," was not examined." The transition period was omitted to focus on the comparison between the presumably less stable pre-ERM period and the relatively stable ERM period. Specific hypotheses to be investigated with these comparisons include the following: If gi-eater exchange i-ate stability brought about higher output growth and lower inflation, a comparison of period I versus period 3 should reveal significantly higher output gm-owth (as measured by industn-ial pr'oduction) and significantly lowen-inflation rates as measured by CPIs) in the later period than in the ear-lien' one. If these conditions are pr-oduced by the ERM, the same indicators for the non-ERM countries should exhibit significantly differ-ent, less beneficial output and price perfon-manc-e.
Equation 1 implies that stability in nominal exchange rate levels may be associated with greater' volatility in money gr-owth, interest rates oroutput, the equation's might-hand-side arguments." If this is the case, measures of variability for these variables may have increased significantly in the ERM countries since 1979. Conver'sely, equation 1 would imply no change in the variability of these variables since 1979 in the non-ERM countries that did not attempt (at least explicitly) to reduce bilateral exchange rate variability.
Some caution in making these comparisons is necessary because they rest on a ceteris paribus assumption. 'l'he simple tests used here do not control for the effects of events that are unique to some countries for example, a crop failure in Europe) or the differential effects ac-ross countries of a common phenomenon (for example, the ener&w price dec-line of the 1980s1. Thus, rather' than attributing a specific result -for example, a change in average money gr'owth rates or the variance of intemest rates -to the ERM, the comparisons are intended solely to neveal consistent patterns of change in the ERM and non-ERM countries. If there are consistent differences in the economic-on-policy performance between the ERM and non-ERM nations, it may be an imutial indication of the possible effects of exchange rate coordination.
D~flèrencesin the Average Values of Selected Economic indicators
The results in table 3 examine the economic measures that the simple theoretical model suggested as important in achieving gn-eater exchange rate stability. The table 3 entries compare the "For more general treatments of how policies and economies are linked, see Frenkel (1986) or Kahn (1987) . "Ungerer, et al., p. 11. "Wood (i983) , examining data for all EMS countries, found greater nominal exhange rate stability to be associated with greater variation in unanticipated interest rate changes in all cases except Ireland. Kingdom amid other' non-fiRM countr'ies -despite ERM country has been reduced significantly since the absence of any explicit exchange rate agree-1983. Some observers expected this r-esult fiomn an ment -also were significantly r-educed." This "Deorauwe and Verfaille, pp. 29-30, also show that the uncoorquickly, than the coordinated ERM actions. This result is condinafed policy actions of non-ERM industrialized economies sistent with the theoretical reasoning in Rogoff (1985b) . achieved lower average rates of inflation, and did so more variability did dec-line among EtOvl c-ountm-ies but increased both among the non-hEM nations and between the ERM and non-ERM countries, it is imiteresting to see how tn-ade flows changed after 1979 both within the ERM group and between the ERM and nori-ERM nations.
'l'able 5 shows that the gr-owth of intt-a-ERM trade declined in ERM economies (except ttalvl dur-ing the period of greater exchange n-ate stability. tn contrast, trade by non-fiRM memnhers both with each other and the ERM gn-oup often rose, even though these exchange n-ates became more variable. Canada, Japan and the United States ar-c the notable cases of this result. Or the basis of these r-esults, again holding other things constant, gm-eaten-ERM exchange rate stability was not associated with relatively larger intra-ERM trade.
SU.J.IIUARY
Proposals for policy coordiriation among the major industrial economies have been disc-missed nlnor-e frequently in r-ecent year-s. Initially such proposals were imitended to cori-ect what wer-e per-ceived as problems created by a 'high' -value of the U.S. dollar; subsequently, they were intended to mitigate the adverse consequences of variable exchange r-ates and the falling value of the dollar.
One attempt to coomilinate domestic policies in r-ecent years in pursuit of stable bilater-al nominal exchange rates is found in the EMS. Evidence based on data befon-e and after the establishment of the EMS suggests that, while hilater-al exchange r-ates have become more stable, other measures of economic performance and policy actions fail to show the effects of such coordination. Lowen-inflation tates in ERM countries have been matched by lower inflation rates in major-non-ERM economies. Other variables, such as money gm-owth, inter--est rates and real output mneasur-es also show no consistent difièm-ential response in ERM and non-ERM countries in recent years. The data do not even show that intra-ERM trade has increased any more than trade with non-fiRM countries, despite the reductiomis in exchange rate variability among fiRM nations. Overall, the only experience we have with concerted policy coordination does not indicate that general economic or policy measures have been much affected -one way or another -by such coordination.
The pnivate use of ECLJs, however, is a different matten-. Because it represents a tiasket of fiG c-un--rencies and because a formal agn-eemnent exists to keep constituent cur-r-encies within specilied bounds, investor-s have viewed financial instn,nments denominated in ECUs to be less risky than similar' instruments denominated in a specific currency. For this r'eason, sight and time deposits, loans and bonds all have been offened denominated in ECUs. Thus, the ECU may be viewed best as a c-un-eric-v index unit of account that van-ies less than its constituent cun'encies.
'l'he ELi on'iginallv had been mlended to serve also as a means ut settlement and a reserve asset. tti 1)0th cases, howeyen-, its use has been small. It is n-an-ely used as a means of settlement and, as a n-eserve asset, is largely a substitute for-the gold and dollar' deposits a member c-oirntrv gave up to join the EMS. I Inn l.( t itsell is~~inininI. n neightecl ftnskrt ml I..\1S nnleninInmn n'mnr'niInn-in',~s slin~~ni inn tInt' turIn' ,ns iii ',1j)Ii'nlihI' IT lt)hl. nnnm' Itt n,ns m'miimal to he inninket 'alnie ml 371 Ke1141,mnn I'anr~11.219 thinnish Li nines and so mini~jrimnsstin'' It) I.'\lS r'LIn'renrmes in' tinini'. hnnlh lu'~vi'i~Ints ,ntt,ielnn'ml tnĩ 'mIn'nnnn'mi'',~nnimi tlnein nnn,nn'Lel~aioes nel,nIi~m' to noni-I.\l"n i'unn'ni'nnc'nms l1,m~n'i'ln. 
